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TEACHING APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN AN
APPELLATE CLINICAL LAW PROGRAM
J Thomas Sullivan*
The predominantly urban location of most American law
schools offers a particularly fertile environment in which clinical
legal education thrives. Proximity to major court systems and a
significant potential client population, which is typically indigent
and underrepresented by legal services programs and pro bono
representation projects,' affords law school clinical programs
both the necessary base for operation and access to litigation in-
stitutions that make clinical training uniquely valuable within the
law school curriculum.
Clinical legal education does not, of course, function primar-
ily as a means to provide representation for a potential client
population otherwise unable to obtain counsel due to lack of eco-
nomic resources. In fact, it may not even encompass live client
representation at all to qualify as "clinical" course content within
the curriculum. 2 "Live client" clinical programs, however, do
necessarily provide some measure of representation assistance to
the economically disenfranchised. In so doing, these programs
are a part of the total package of uncompensated legal services
available to the population, though a clearly less significant one
in terms of caseload or numbers of clients served, to more formal
efforts directly targeted at the need for indigent representation,
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; Director of
SMU Appellate Clinic, 1984-86; formerly Appellate Defender, New Mexico Public
Defender Department. The author has practiced in the appellate courts of Texas,
New Mexico and Colorado, the Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits Courts of Appeals,
and the United States Supreme Court. The author wishes to acknowledge the com-
ments and support offered by Professor Roark M. Reed, Director of the SMU Crim-
inal Justice Clinic.
I For lively discussion on the emerging role of pro bono projects as a response
to the needs of indigent and near-indigent clients, see Esther F. Lardent, Mandatoy
Pro Bono in Civil Cases: The Wrong Answer to the Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 1 (1990)
(considering whether pro bono representation should be mandatory and enforcea-
ble or remain essentially voluntary in nature).
2 See ABA Comm. on Guidelines for Clinical Legal Education, Report of the
Association of American Law Schools-A.B.A. COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR
CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION, (1980)[hereinafter AALS/ABA Guidelines]. The Com-
mittee report included a broad definition of "Clinical Legal Studies" encompassing
"law student performance on live cases or problems, or in simulation of the law-
yer's role .. " Id. at 12.
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particularly in civil matters.3
Moreover, clinical programs ultimately serve to promote the
interests of indigent client populations in access to representa-
tion by exposing law students to career choices that are directly
related to providing representation to the poor.4 For instance,
many students will be introduced to the interesting possibilities
for career development offered by public defender and legal
services offices as a result of their exposure to similar caseloads
in clinical law programs. Even if long range commitment to pov-
erty law or indigent criminal defense is a less compelling factor in
the initial career choice than the immediate opportunity for
courtroom work or the reality of a shrinking private sector job
market,5 indigent clients may nevertheless be well served by
these choices.
3 The right to counsel in most phases of criminal litigation without regard to
economic means for compensation of counsel is well established in United States
Supreme Court decisions. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel in felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin Sheriff, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (ex-
tending right to counsel to misdemeanor cases involving loss of liberty); Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (limiting right to counsel in misdemeanor cases to
those in which defendant actually sentenced to jail term); Evitts v. Lucey, 449 U.S.
387 (1985) (extending Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to
appellate process). But see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (no right to
counsel in post-conviction proceedings conferred by Constitution, even in capital
cases where death sentence has been imposed). Even though indigent criminal de-
fendants are entitled to representation by publicly-paid counsel, the lack of ade-
quate funding to support the system providing for indigent defense has generated
an on-going crisis. This crisis focuses on both the quality of representation ren-
dered and the obligation of private attorneys to assist with indigent defense when
the system is unable, due either to ethical conflicts or increasing caseloads, to meet
the need. See, e.g., Paul C. Drecksel, The Crisis in Indigent Criminal Defense, 44 ARK. L.
REV. 363, 402-08 (1991) (setting forth comparative figures for indigent defense ex-
penditure by jurisdiction).
4 These career choices are clearly significant in terms of long-term availability
of representation because mandatory pro bono programs may run afoul of consti-
tutional protections that prevent the judiciary from imposing a duty on private at-
torneys to represent indigent civil litigants, even though courts encourage counsel
to undertake such representation. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (holding that federal judges could not compel
private attorneys to provide representation in civil matters, despite language in 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) that authorizes courts to request counsel to represent litigants pro-
ceeding in forma pauperis).
5 When the issue of imposition of a mandatory pro bono requirement was
presented to the Florida Supreme Court as a means of ensuring representation for
indigent civil litigants, the court rejected mandatory representation. In re Emer-
gency Delivery of Legal Serv. to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39, 41 (Fla. 1983). The court
observed and probably quite correctly:
We believe that a person's voluntary service to others has to come
from within the soul of that person. Our canons in this area are
designed to be directory, to enlighten one's conscience, to focus at-
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At least in part, an important function of urban legal educa-
tion will continue to be to use clinical education as a vehicle for
introducing law students to the possibilities of representing indi-
gent citizens. 6 Because impoverished Americans are intensely
concentrated in our nation's major cities, clinical legal education
will play a key role in furthering the goal of representation for
traditionally under-represented urban populations.
Within the traditional clinical law framework, certain litiga-
tion experiences are most suggestive of an "urban orientation,"
as opposed to those experiences that are essentially geographi-
cally neutral. For example, because of the significant problems
related to public assistance and leased housing that are aggra-
vated by urban population growth, clinical programs focusing on
adjudication, litigation or negotiation of issues relating to assist-
ance eligibility or access to housing7 will have a peculiarly "ur-
tention on what is right for lawyers to do, but, historically, have not
meant to force an involuntary act.
Id. Despite the best intentions of those who argue for mandatory pro bono pro-
grams, it is difficult to imagine that such a program will truly address the problems
of building and maintaining attorney/client relationships when counsel is hostile to
the very notion of such service. Instead, the preferable course is probably institu-
tionalization of representation in offices specifically designed to provide represen-
tation for the poor, such as public defender and legal services offices, and
development of voluntary pro bono programs as a means of involving private prac-
titioners interested in making the commitment necessary to undertake representa-
tion without compensation. Law school clinical programs are valuable in exposing
students to these options in the context of skill-building experiences.
6 Exposure to the potential for professional and personal satisfaction from pov-
erty or public interest law practice is invaluable because of the continuing need for
attorney availability to the poor and traditionally under-represented segments of
the community. In the absence of mandatory pro bono requirements, which call
into question both the obligation of private counsel to provide services without
charge and the commitment of counsel performing under "duress," the long range
interests of those client populations is probably best served by stimulation of law-
yer interest in representation of the poor or public interest during the law school
years. A personally rewarding clinic experience is one significant way to influence
students to choose careers involving representation of the poor or career commit-
ment to voluntary pro bono effort as a component of professional life.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct couch the lawyer's duty to engage in
pro bono representation in terms of encouragement only:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may dis-
charge this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee
or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public service or
charitable groups or organizations, by service in activities for improv-
ing the law, the legal system or the legal profession. ...
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1991) (emphasis added).
7 For instance, the University of Baltimore Housing Law Clinic represented the
respondent in Housing Opportunities Comm. of Montgomery County v. Lacey, 585 A.2d
219 (Md. 1991), an action challenging repossession of a public housing unit based
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ban" dimension appropriately addressed at urban-based centers
of legal education.8 Similarly, the sheer number of families suf-
fering domestic problems, such as abuse, dissolution of mar-
riages, adoption and interaction with public agencies involved
with child supervision,9 and non-payment of court-ordered
spousal or child support, lend themselves to legal services fo-
cused on family law problems.'° These same concerns may serve
to underwrite specialized clinical practice programs, focusing on
family law problems, that provide students with valuable expo-
sure to the problems confronting families suffering domestic ten-
sion and the judicial system's limitations in responding to their
needs.
Other potential clinical experience subjects may be pecu-
liarly linked to urban legal education, not because they reflect the
nature of urban life generally, but because access to specialized
systems of regulation or litigation are traditionally located in ur-
ban areas. For instance, a clinical program featuring resolution
and litigation of claims over disputed federal income taxationI
may be well-suited to an urban law school, not because the claims
are peculiarly "urban" in nature, but because the Internal Reve-
nue Service may maintain an urban office through which these
on the respondent's alleged constructive possession of a controlled substance
found in her son's bedroom and paraphernalia found in the bedroom of her
apartment.
8 In fact, the Rutgers Urban Legal Clinic filed as amicus curiae in In Re Executive
Comm'n on Ethical Standards Re: Appearance of Rutgers Attorneys, 116 N.J. 216, 561 A.2d
542 (1989). The designation of the clinical program as an "urban" law clinic sug-
gested the orientation of the program to problems of a peculiarly "urban" nature,
such as availability of housing. Similarly, the Urban Law Clinic at the University of
Detroit is identified as counsel of record in People v. Austin, 257 N.W.2d 120 (1977).
9 For example, the University of Texas Children's Rights Clinic served as
guardian ad litem and appeared on appeal in E.B. v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 766
S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989). Similarly, decisions identify the University of
Michigan Child Advocacy Clinic in Bates v. Sanchez, 375 N.W.2d 353 (1985), and the
University of Richmond Youth Advocacy Clinic in Grigg v. Commonwealth, 297 S.E.2d
799 (1982), as counsel of record and amicus curiae, respectively, in those actions.
10 For instance, clinics specializing in addressing problems of women in legal
contexts have operated at American University's Washington College of Law, see
Fitzgeraldv. Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719 (D.C. 1989) (Women and the Law Clinic filed as
amicus curiae), and Rutgers University, see Fischer v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dept. of Pub.
Welfare, 482 A.2d 1148 (1984) (Women's Rights Litigation Clinic filed brief as ami-
cus curiae).
I I Disputes over state taxation may also provide a basis for litigation in the
clinical law setting. In Nagaraja v. Comm. of Revenue, 1983 WL 1847 (Minn. Tax Ct.
Mar. 3, 1983), for example, the University of Minnesota Legal Aid Clinic repre-
sented aggrieved taxpayers in a property tax refund dispute before the state tax
court.
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claims may be processed and resolved.' 2 This is also true of so-
cial security disability claims, which are most likely heard by ad-
ministrative law judges sitting in urban locations.
Of particular interest here is the creation of a clinical law
program to handle appellate matters,' 3 which may be facilitated
by the urban location of state or federal appellate courts, occa-
sionally adjacent to a law school facility.'
4
Professor Robert Martineau has authored a compelling ex-
amination of the absence of formal study of the appellate process
and practice in most American law school curricula. 5 Perhaps
12 For example, Southern Methodist University has operated a Tax Clinic which
handles claims for qualifying taxpayers for a number of years. The program in-
cludes litigation of claims that cannot be resolved by negotiation in the United
States Tax Court. The program is unique because its client population is not nec-
essarily indigent and many of the clients stand to receive money from the govern-
ment if successful.
13 Even a superficial search of current law school catalogs reveals a considerable
interest in appellate clinical law programs in the nation's law schools. The follow-
ing law schools indicate operation of an appellate clinical law program: Akron,
American, Brooklyn, Capital, Franklin Pierce, Georgetown, Kansas, Lewis and
Clark, Northern Illinois, Notre Dame, Pace, Tulane and Yale. Emory operates the
Georgia Appellate Resource Center and Loyola of Chicago offers an appellate prac-
ticum. Other schools operate post-conviction representation programs or projects:
Georgia State, Montana, New England, Southern California, Virginia and William
and Mary. St. Mary's offers a capital punishment clinical law program and Yeshiva/
Benjamin Cardozo and Duquesne indicate formal appellate externships are avail-
able to students.
14 For instance, the South Texas College of Law shares its facility with the Texas
Court of Appeals for the 14th Judicial District in Houston. Similary, the University
of Puget Sound in Tacoma shares its facility with Division II of the Washington
Court of Appeals. In many smaller states, the state appellate courts are located
typically in the state capital. When the law school is also located in the capital city,
easy access to the appellate process is afforded by the geographic proximity. Of
course, the location of major state facilities is such that, historically the major state
institutions, such as the capital, penitentiary and state university, often were decen-
tralized to appease different constituencies. Although prison facilities are infre-
quently located in close proximity to law schools, a number of schools have
undertaken clinical law programs directly related to representing the incarcerated
clients. See, e.g., State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987) (amicus curiae
brief filed by Rutgers Prison Law Clinic); Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719 (Del. 1990)
(appellant represented by Widener Post-Conviction Relief Clinic); Kyle v. State,
364 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1985) (appellant represented by University of Iowa Prisoner
Assistance Clinic).
15 Robert J. Martineau, Appellate Litigation: Its Place in the Law School Curriculum,
39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 71 (1987). Professor Martineau observes:
One of the most curious aspects of the law school curriculum is the
apparent inconsistency between its almost total reliance upon the
opinions of appellate courts as the vehicle for teaching both proce-
dural and substantive law and the paucity of courses that deal with
appellate courts as institutions, the law of the appellate process, ap-
pellate procedure, or the skills of the appellate litigator.
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the leading proponent for including appellate litigation in a cur-
riculum otherwise typically dominated by the study of appellate
judicial opinions, Professor Martineau suggests that relegating
the study of appellate process and practice to moot court pro-
grams may fail to satisfy the need for educating students in skills
and thinking assumed to represent only a minor portion of actual
work of practicing attorneys.' 6 Of course, to the extent that the
development of legal principle is intimately tied to appellate
work, even if the perception that a relatively small part of practice
involves appellate litigation were correct, that percentage un-
doubtedly has an impact far beyond the billable hours devoted to
the preparation of appellate briefs and presentation of oral argu-
ments.17 Moreover, one might conclude that the skills necessary
for effective appellate advocacy are those skills which are of
greatest significance for litigators and non-litigators alike:' 8 the
ability to develop legal issues and marshal supporting facts to
support the client's position, the integration of precedent and
evaluation of impact of unique fact settings upon application of
Id. (citations omitted).
16 This perceived inadequacy of law school moot court programs to teach appel-
late advocacy and process was the focus of the 1985 Report and Recommendations
of the Committee on Appellate Skills Training, approved by the Appellate Judges
Conference of the American Bar Association. Appellate Litigation Skills Training, The
Role of the Law Schools: Report and Recommendations of the Committee on Appellate Skills
Training, A.B.A.JuD. ADMIN. Div. (Appellate Judges' Conference June 1985) [here-
inafter Appellate Skills Training Report].
The core problem noted by the Appellate Skills Training Report is set forth in the
preface authored by Committee Chairman John Frank:
A lifetime of working with appeals has led me to some personal con-
victions:
1. Most moot court programs for most students have very little
educational value. As an employer, often of second year law clerks
with little more than a first year of law school, I see about 100 moot
court briefs a year drawn from the national market; they are the typi-
cal writing sample. For research, writing, or advocacy they are not
worth much.
2. Trial court procedure is in all curricula. Appellate procedure
is in very few.
3. The use of feigned cases for moot court problems instead of
actual records makes a bad matter worse.
4. These are at root economic problems. Appellate procedure
can be taught as any other class, but actual doing requires a high per-
sonnel commitment.
Id. at III.
17 See id. at 4.
18 See Report and Recommendations to the Task Force on Lawyer Competency: The Role of
the Law Schools, A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, (August
10, 1979). This report identified fundamental skills to include the ability to:
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legal principle, and the need to cogently express the position de-
veloped in support of the client's needs and interests. 9
The operation of an appellate clinical law program within
the law school curriculum affords one alternative for teaching
both the principles of appellate process and the skills necessary
for practice. This article focuses on the potential for teaching
appellate litigation theory and skills through an appellate clinical
law program. 20 The program is certainly not necessary to the de-
velopment or maintenance of a sound legal education program,
but it does offer an alternative to reliance on occasional refer-
ences concerning appellate decision-making in traditional course
offerings 2' and relegation of skills training to moot court pro-
1) analyze legal problems;
2) perform legal research;
3) collect and sort facts;
4) write effectively (both in general and in a variety of specialized
lawyer applications... );
5) communicate orally with effectiveness in a variety of settings;





7) organize and manage legal work.
Id. at 9-10.
The Appellate Skills Training Report relies on this same formulation of essential
skills to establish a starting point for training appellate advocates. Appellate Skills
Training Report, supra note 16, at 7.
19 For an additional perspective on the relation between appellate clinical pro-
grams and the training of lawyers for practice, see Steven H. Goldblatt and Susan
L. Siegal, Training the Appellate Advocate: Strategies Firms Can Adopt from a Law School-
Program, 20 TRIAL 56 (June 1984). Goldblatt directs the appellate litigation clinic at
Georgetown. Id. at 57.
20 The Appellate Skills Training Report noted that a 1985 survey undertaken for the
Committee showed:
There are approximately sixty-five law schools that have one or more
courses [in appellate advocacy] for upper-level students taught by
full-time or adjunct faculty members. Twenty-three schools have
courses that cover both appellate process and procedure and brief
writing and oral argument, twenty-four have courses limited to brief
writing and oral argument, ten have courses limited to appellate pro-
cess and procedure, and twelve have clinical programs with students writing
briefs in actual appeals. Most of these courses are of only recent origin,
a number having been added only in the past year.
Appellate Skills Training Report, supra note 16, at 15 n.16. (emphasis added).
21 Of course, it is far more affordable to simply add a formal course in appellate
process and practice to the traditional curriculum, considering the relative expense
of focusing on appellate process in the context of a traditional classroom course
and operation of a clinic specializing in appellate work. See Appellate Skills Training
Report, supra note 16, at 25.
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grams as a means of training appellate advocates.
The article discusses the author's experience in directing an
appellate clinical law program at Southern Methodist University
over a two and one-half year period. The observations are per-
sonal and certainly not intended to provide an exhaustive insight
into appellate clinic operations or the benefits students may en-
joy from clinic participation.2 Other successful programs have
operated in different settings utilizing different approaches for
far longer periods of time. For example, the Georgetown Appel-
late Litigation Clinic has operated for many years as a much
larger and better-staffed appellate law office,23 while Franklin
Pierce has enjoyed the advantages of housing the New Hamp-
shire appellate defender office and providing an intensive experi-
ence in the development of criminal law and procedure in a
relatively rural setting. Any comprehensive study of appellate
clinical education would necessitate an investigation of these and
other programs, which have offered a comparable or diverse ap-
pellate practice experience.24
22 One positive consequence of the appellate clinical law experience for students
is the highly specialized training provided in the clinic program, which enhances
marketability of the students' skills, particularly with regard to positions that fea-
ture significant amounts of appellate work with large civil practice firms, prosecu-
tors' offices and defenders' offices.
23 In fact, Georgetown offers graduate fellowships supporting work for the
LL.M. in conjunction with the Appellate Litigation Clinic. Fellows participate as
counsel of record in appellate cases, supervise students in the preparation of their
briefs and assist the Director in teaching the seminar portion of the course. ANNUAL
DIRECTORY OF GRADUATE LAW PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 30 (1st ed. 1990).
24 Even a cursory examination of published opinions available in a Westlaw sur-
vey demonstrates the significant amount of appellate litigation engaged in by law
school clinical programs in recent years. A sample of published opinions, by
clinical program, follows:
American: Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 566 A.2d 719 (D.C. 1989); Arizona:
Willmon v. State ex rel. Eyman, 493 P.2d 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972);
Arizona State: Teren v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Center, 706
P.2d 382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); Baltimore: Housing Opportunities
Comm'n of Montgomery City v. Lacey, 585 A.2d 219 (Md. 1991); Cap-
ital: Silcott v. Dahlberg, 550 N.E.2d 477 (Ohio 1990); Chicago: Wild-
wood Indus. v. Ill. Human Rights Comm., 580 N.E.2d 172 (Il. App.
Ct. 1991); Cincinnati: State v. Donnerson, No. C-830254, 1984 WL
4195 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25, 1984); Cleveland State: Gumsey v. Craw-
ford, 679 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1982); Colorado: Patterson v. People, 333
P.2d 1047 (Colo. 1959) (en banc); Connecticut: Norman v. Conn. State
Bd. of Parole, 458 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972); Dayton: Celestino v. Celes-
tino, No. 6676, 1981 WL 2771 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981); Detroit: People v.
Austin, 257 N.W.2d 120 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977); DePaul: Mullins v.
People, 341 N.E.2d 140 (111. App. Ct. 1975); Georgia: Chandler v.
State, 364 S.E.2d 273 (Ga. 1973); Georgetown: Williams v. United
1284
1992] TEACHING APPELLATE ADVOCACY 1285
Comparison of the clinical law experience with practice is
also based upon personal observations of the author reflecting
on more than a dozen years of experience as an appellate lawyer
in a numerous settings. While these observations may be shared
by other appellate lawyers, the context in which the experience
occurs generally tends to shape that lawyer's perspective. For ex-
ample, an appellate public defender suffers from frustrations not
altogether parallel with her counterpart on the other side of the
docket.25 Similarly, while the approach to formulating issues and
briefing may be roughly the same regardless of whether the case
is civil or criminal in nature, the lawyer's obligations in directing
States, 576 A.2d 1339 (D.C. 1990); George Washington: Brodis v. United
States, 468 A.2d 1335 (D.C. 1983); Illinois: Radivojevic v. Radivojevic,
295 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Iowa: Kyle v. State, 364 N.W.2d
558 (Iowa 1985); Loyola/New Orleans: State v. Washington, 461 So. 2d
392 (La. Ct. App. 1984); Maine: Brackett v. Larrivee, 562 A.2d 138
(Me. 1989); Michigan: In re Taurus F., 330 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 1982);
Minnesota: Nagaraja v. Comm'n of Revenue, Nos. 3476, 3477, 3478,
3479, 3480, 1983 WL 1847 (Minn. Tax 1983); N.Y. U.: People v.
Hicks, 381 N.Y.S.2d 794 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1976); Northwestern: Hanra-
han v. Thieret, 933 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1991); Northwestern/Lewis &
Clark: Kongas v. Employment Div., 578 P.2d 507 (Or. Ct. App. 1978);
Richmond: Harris v. Lynchburg Div. of Social Servs., 288 S.E.2d 410
(Va. 1982); Rutgers/Newark: State v. Barnes, 84 N.J. 362, 420 A.2d 303
(1980); Southern Illinois: Ashline v. Verble, 474 N.E.2d 764 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984); Syracuse: In re Rabin v. Onondaga County Bd. of Elections,
326 N.Y.S.2d 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971); Tennessee: Hill v. Califano,
592 F.2d 341 (6th Cir. 1979); Texas: E.B. v. Tex. Dept. of Human
Servs., 766 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Toledo: Hartley v. Hart-
ley, 537 N.E.2d 706 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Tulane: State v. Williams,
457 So. 2d 610 (La. 1984); Valparaiso: Guajardo v. State, 544 N.E.2d
174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); Vanderbilt: Harvey v. State, 749 S.W.2d 478
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1988); Widener: Riley v. State, 585 A.2d 719 (Del.
1990); Yale: Hardy v. Griffin, 569 A.2d 49 (Conn. 1989).
25 For example, counsel in criminal appellate matters are obligated to perform
within what may often be an involuntary context because the courts appoint coun-
sel to represent an accused otherwise unable to afford to hire an attorney. Penson
v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citation omitted). Representation may entail the
duty, imposed by court rule or decision, to determine whether the client's appeal is
frivolous and require counsel to provide authority demonstrating that the appeal
lacks merit. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel must, never-
theless, continue to act as an advocate for the client throughout the procedure. Id.
at 744-45. This apparent conflict between the allegiance that the attorney owes to
the client and the allegiance owed to the court is most apparent when the criminal
appellant seeks to have non-frivolous points presented when counsel's judgment is
that their weakness may dilute the strength of other issues. Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 753 (1983). The conflict is also apparent when counsel is duty-bound to
prove the lack of merit in his own client's appeal. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin, District 1, 486 U.S. 429, 437 (1988).
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the appeal may differ for individual appellate attorneys as a result
of the operation of different procedural rules.
Thus, the article is meant to be informative only, and reflect
the author's personal experiences operating in a single appellate
clinical law program, which itself had only a limited lifespan.
Hopefully, it might prove instructive for others who would un-
dertake a similar type of program, just as Professor Martineau's
article offers a rationale for curriculum innovation that might
lead to the adoption of more traditional courses focusing on the
art and practice of appellate court decisionmaking.
THE SMU APPELLATE CLINIC: AN OVERVIEW
During the calendar years 1985 and 1986, Southern Method-
ist University School of Law (SMU) operated an Appellate Clinic
as a component of its clinical education program. Financed prin-
cipally by Department of Education grants,26 the program termi-
nated due to lack of institutional funding in 1987. In its two
years of operation, however, the Appellate Clinic provided an ap-
pellate advocacy opportunity for a limited number of SMU stu-
dents, which afforded far greater insight into the appellate
decision-making process than the typical exposure provided by
legal writing and moot court programs.2 7
At the outset, the Appellate Clinic fit comfortably into an ex-
isting clinical education scheme in which SMU ambitiously
sought to provide training experiences that reflected not only the
faculty's strengths, but also the diversity of practice in Dallas. 28
26 These grants were made available under Part F of Title IX of the Higher Edu-
cation Act of 1965, as amended, which creates the Law School Clinical Experience
Program. 20 U.S.C. § 1136 (1988). The grants program is administered by the
Department of Education.
27 SMU clinical faculty and students had practiced on a limited basis in Texas
appellate courts prior to the operation of the Appellate Clinic and continue to liti-
gate appellate issues arising in the context of clinic representation. See, e.g.,Jones v.
Stayman, 747 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1987), rev g 732 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
The Civil Cases Clinic successfully challenged a trial court's order denying a free
transcript for purposes of appeal for an indigent appellant whose parental rights
had been terminated in a clinic-tried jury trial. The termination was later affirmed
after appeal on the record. Jones v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 761 S.W. 2d
103 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
28 The court system operating in Dallas is divided according to function with
general jurisdiction courts in civil matters (district court), felony criminal matters
(district and criminal district courts), family law, and juvenile courts. County courts
are divided into those that have limited jurisdiction in civil matters (county courts at
law), misdemeanor matters (county criminal courts) and probate and mental illness
matters (probate courts). A county court of criminal appeals hears de novo appeals
1286 [Vol. 22:1277
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The program included alternatives in the Civil Cases Clinic and
the Criminal Justice Clinic, which provided state court litigation
experience roughly parallelling the jurisdictional separation of
the Dallas County and Texas court system into criminal and civil
courts. In addition, the program supported a Tax Clinic that af-
forded students an entre into the world of tax litigation and ne-
gotiation, complementing SMU's traditionally strong taxation
program. 29 An expansive externship program placed students as
unpaid student clerks with state and federal courts and agencies,
corporate legal departments and non-profit interest groups. The
externship program has now been terminated but, with the ex-
ception of the Appellate Clinic, the clinical program remains
intact.
The Appellate Clinic gained judicial support during its brief
existence, as reflected in a number of published opinions ren-
dered in clinic cases30 and the willingness of state trial and appel-
late judges to entertain student representation in appellate
from those municipal courts that are not courts of record and justice of the peace
courts, which have jurisdiction over traffic violations and the lowest class of misde-
meanors not subjecting the offender to incarceration. The Texas Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District also sits in Dallas.
29 The SMU approach comports with the goal of organizing clinical education
into specific courses emphasizing discrete subject areas set forth in AALS/ABA
Guidelines for Clinical Legal Education, supra note 2, at 19.
A cursory review of published decisions indicates that other law schools have
utilized this approach in tying clinical education to discrete curriculum areas. For
instance, the Southern Reporter includes published decisions reflecting representa-
tion in Louisiana appellate courts by the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic-Loui-
siana Chemical Assoc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 577 So. 2d 230 (La. Ct.
App. 1991); TulaneJuvenile Law Clinic-In re Gray, 454 So. 2d 307 (La. Ct. App.
1984); Tulane Appellate Advocacy Clinic-State ex rel. Womack v. Blackburn, 393
So. 2d 1216 (La. 1981); Tulane Criminal Law Clinic-State v. Dawson, 490 So. 2d
560 (La. Ct. App. 1986); and finally, Tulane Law Clinic-State v. Wilson, 508 So.
2d 960 (La. Ct. App. 1987). The different designations may reflect changes in
names applied within the clinical law program, particularly as programs evolve, but
nevertheless, serve to underscore the diversity potential in a comprehensive clinical
law approach.
30 A number of published opinions printed in the Southwestern Reporter identified
the SMU Appellate Clinic and student counsel. See Mattias v. State, 683 S.W.2d 789
(Tex. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd, 731 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 831 (1988); Beatty v. Martin, 690 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Wicker v.
State, 696 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985), aff'd, 740 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 938 (1988); Ex parte Allen, 699 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1985); Bickems v. State, 708 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Pryor v. State,
719 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986); Pryor v. State, 719 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); Juan A v. Dallas County Child Wel-
fare Unit, 726 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); King v. State, 733 S.W.2d 704
(Tex. Ct. 1987) Griffin v. State, 725 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) rev'd, 779
S.W.2d 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
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matters.3'
The Goal of the Appellate Clinical Law Experience
As with any clinical law program, the central goals of the
SMU Appellate Clinic were to provide students with a controlled
opportunity to develop litigation skills and to provide clients with
effective representation in the cases where clinic students served
as counsel. The program combined a classroom component with
case representation and was established as a four-hour, graded
course. The intensive nature of the case workload, however, se-
verely limited the number of students who could be managed ad-
equately by the single supervising attorney available under the
budget. 2 In retrospect, this resulted in some de-emphasis in the
course's classroom component.
The appellate clinical law experience will generally serve
three distinct purposes for the student and institution. First, in
contrast to the typical legal writing experience devoted to brief
writing and oral advocacy, and contrary to moot court exper-
iences, the student in the clinical law program is forced to con-
front problems on appeal that do not offer the balanced equities
and legal authorities that are usually built into simulated ef-
forts.3 3 As with all clinical training, the benefit derived from ac-
tual representation flows not only from the practice and
31 For example, clinic students gained a reversal of the defendant's conviction
and ninety-nine year sentence imposed for aggravated robbery in Thompson v.
State, No. 05-85-01022-CR (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) based on the trial court's failure
to give a robbery instruction as a lesser-included offense. Clinic student Carol
Vaughn relied on medical records offered by the State at trial, which failed to show
that the complainant suffered substantial bodily injury-a necessary element of
proof for aggravated robbery.
32 The range of duties required of the clinic director almost necessarily limits
the number of students who can be supervised adequately during the term without
additional supervisory personnel to six to eight. For ABA/AALS recommendations
on the ratio of students to faculty, see AALS/ABA Guidelines, supra note 2, at 24-25.
33 The ABA Appellate Litigation report specifically points out the problem from
the standpoint of appellate judges:
There are several reasons for these inadequacies [of traditional moot
court programs]. First and foremost, these programs treat appellate
litigation as involving only two aspects-writing a brief and making an
oral argument. They ignore all of the other important ingredients of
appellate litigation .... Second, and just as fundamental, because they
lack a realistic appeal record they do not aid in the development of the
skill that is unique to appellate litigation: building a case out of a
record. Third, as a result of the first two defects, the issues argued in
these programs are usually abstract legal questions without the factual
content upon which most appeals are decided.
Appellate Skills Training Report, supra note 16, at 13-14.
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development of skills, but from the strategical and tactical con-
straints imposed by the facts and limitation on resources involved
in representing indigent clients. In undertaking appellate repre-
sentation, students are thus obliged to deal with the realities of
factual limitations imposed by the record, errors by trial counsel
in terms of strategy or failure to preserve issues for appeal, 4 and
the often hostile body of caselaw available to answer those ques-
tions. The only two features that really distinguish appellate
clinical practice from post-graduate practice are the absence of
fee setting and collection as a component of the attorney/client
relationship, and the availability of experienced supervision of
the process in every case.
Second, the clinical program provides an opportunity for
both the controlled development of litigation skills and the un-
derstanding of appellate practice rules. The former is significant
because it allows advanced students to review their research and
writing skills, under faculty supervision, in the context of actual
cases. A comparable opportunity for review of the writing and
research skills developed in the first year research and writing
course does not exist anywhere else in the typical curriculum.
Even in the most concentrated law review work, the focus of re-
search is not generally derived from a set of facts, but usually
flows from an existing article or case that focuses research at the
outset on a particular conclusion. In addition, the attention de-
voted to rules relating to appellate practice and preservation of
error may be unique within the typical curriculum unless an of-
fering in appellate practice and process is available as a non-
clinical course.3 5
34 In Coleman v. Thompson, 11l S. Ct. 2546, 2568 (1991), the Supreme Court
underscored once again the roles of preservation of error and procedural default as
critical elements of the appellate decisionmaking process. The Supreme Court
held that a state court's rejection of federal constitutional claims on the basis of
procedural default precludes reconsideration of the federal claims in a habeas
corpus action unless petitioner argues that there has been a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice. This decision amplifies the need to teach students concerning the
impact of procedural rules upon substantive rights in basic litigation courses. See
also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-97 (1987) (applying cause and prejudice
standard, and noting innocent-accused exception to federal review of claims de-
faulted in state proceedings).
35 The Appellate Skills Training Report observes:
Appellate rules expressly regulate many aspects of the appeal process.
These rules govern not only the notice of appeal and the format of the
brief but a wide range of other matters including interlocutory ap-
peals, cross appeals, the record on appeal, relief pending appeal, peti-
tions for extraordinary relief such as mandamus, motions, settlement
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Third, an appellate clinical program thrusts the institution
and student attorneys into the development of case law in the
jurisdiction where the students are practicing.36 This can bring
recognition to the program and institution through the designa-
tion of the clinical law program as counsel of record for the liti-
gant in a published opinion, 7 and also can extend recognition to
the individual student attorneys.3 8 To the extent that the appel-
late clinic interacts with the trial clinics in providing representa-
tion in student-tried cases, 9 the interplay can give the overall
program the range of functions in litigation characteristics of law
firms, prosecutor's office or public defender's office. Moreover,
active interaction between the two clinical programs can provide
valuable instruction in the necessity of protecting the trial record
for appeal, while students researching issues in the appellate
conferences, oral argument, rehearing, frivolous appeals, and seeking
review in a higher court. Either a statute or a rule or both will govern
the time in which an appeal can be taken and the effect of a post-trial
or post-judgment motion on the time to appeal. These are all matters
with which litigators must be familiar, but in all likelihood matters to which they
will never be exposed in law school. Similarly, knowledge of the profes-
sional responsibility obligations of the appellate litigator require spe-
cial attention.
Appellate Skills Training Report, supra note 16, at 10 (emphasis added).
36 For example, in Juan A. v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 726 S.W.2d 241,
242 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), the court of appeals considered an issue of first impres-
sion. The court examined impeachment in a parental right termination case by
using criminal conviction in a prosecution arising from the same facts. The court
held that the conviction was not admissible under either Rule 609 or Rule 803(22)
of the Texas Rules of Evidence because the case was still pending disposition on
appeal at the time the conviction was offered at appellant's parental rights termina-
tion trial.
37 For example, in Bickems v. State, 708 S.W.2d 541 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), the
Southwestern Reporter indicated counsel as follows:
J. Thomas Sullivan, Director, Charles Glanville, Student Counsel,
SMU Appellate Clinic, Dallas, for appellant.
Id. at 542.
38 See, e.g., State v. Cook, 404 So. 2d 1210 (La. 1981). Counsel were identified as
follows:
Elizabeth Cole, Supervising Atty., New OrleansJohn A. Murphy, Stu-
dent Practitioner, Tulane Appellate Advocacy Clinic, for defendant-
appellant.
Id. at 1211.
39 See, e.g., King v. State, 733 S.W.2d 704, 705 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), rev'd, 800
S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). This was a drunken driving prosecution tried
and appealed by SMU Criminal Justice Clinic students. The case ultimately re-
sulted in reversal on state law grounds after the Court of Criminal Appeals re-
manded for reconsideration of the reversal in light of United States Supreme
Court's decision in Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (holding Fourth Amend-
ment not necessarily violated by operation of sobriety check-point or roadblock by
police pursuant to administrative plan).
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clinic may direct trial counsel to issues that should be developed
for future appellate challenges.
The Appellate Clinic Caseload
The source of appellate cases poses a problem for any
clinical law program designed to provide students with experi-
ence in a number of pending appeals. Given the length of time
for preparation of the record on appeal in many jurisdictions, it is
difficult for students enrolled in a semester-format clinical pro-
gram to complete all the steps in a single appeal-even excluding
post-decision motions-over the course of a single term. To ex-
pose students to the range of activities involved in appellate rep-
resentation, it is necessary to maintain a steady flow of appellate
matters so that case experience may be adjusted to permit stu-
dents an opportunity to engage in as many significant aspects of
appellate representation as possible. This requires a steady flow
of cases that will permit relatively stable work assignments that
broaden the student's perspective through representation in sev-
eral cases, as opposed to a single case.
Typically, counsel will face the preparation of three distinct
types of documents during the course of an appeal. First, the
opening and answer briefs will focus on the development of is-
sues from the trial record and response. Second, following deci-
sion, counsel will be involved in evaluating the need for a motion
for rehearing, a prerequisite to seeking further review in many
jurisdictions. Counsel will also participate in preparing the mo-
tion or response, which requires reviewing the court's holding in
light of the record and controlling case law. Third, following dis-
position in the intermediate appellate court, counsel must evalu-
ate the option of seeking review in the court of last resort by
preparing an appropriate petition or writ, or response, which will
either challenge the disposition in light of existing law by the
court of appeals or petition the court to change the law. By hav-
ing students participate in each phase of the appeal, even if not
undertaken in the same case, students become aware of the dif-
ferent approaches counsel must take to the problems posed by
the peculiar nature of each step in the appellate process.
The assignments involved in each stage of the process neces-
sarily involve an initial understanding of the standard used by
appellate courts in deciding questions on appeal, such as whether
an abuse of discretion standard or manifest error standard, must
be met to reverse a trial court's discretionary act. Once a deci-
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sion has been rendered, on the other hand, the student must de-
termine whether the decision correctly relates the facts
developed at trial and correctly applied the facts to the legal prin-
ciple involved. The decision to seek further review focuses on
policy and justice arguments, which may afford a basis for relief
even when existing law has been correctly applied by an interme-
diate court.40
To ensure student exposure to the different concerns of the
common steps in an appeal, the overall program may be
designed to involve each student in preparation of a sampling of
appellate documents. In a direct appeal, for example, students
may be required to draft the opening or answer brief, a motion
for rehearing or response. This will necessitate an evaluation of
the merits of seeking further review and preparation of the re-
quired petition or response for filing in the court of last resort.
The SMU Appellate Clinic had three sources of appellate
cases. First, the clinic was appointed to represent a number of
appellants who had been convicted of felonies by the Dallas
County criminal district courts. 41 Second, the clinic served as ap-
pellate counsel in a small number of cases tried by the civil and
criminal trial clinics.42 Third, the Clinic was available for referral
40 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Payne v. Tennessee, 11l S.Ct. 2597
(1991), overturned four-year old precedent in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1991). The Court rejected Booth's proscription against the use of the so-called
"victim impact statement" during punishment phase testimony and arguments in
capital murder prosecutions. This suggests that counsel may now routinely assert
arguments for overruling recent authority reached on the narrow vote of a split
court. Payne suggests the need to incorporate discussion in the appellate advocacy
course of the role appellate counsel should undertake in challenging adverse au-
thority-particularly of recent, but non-unanimous decisions-as a tactic in prose-
cuting appeals.
41 A virtue of reliance on appointments from felony courts is the relatively large
number of appeals available for clinic referral. This affords security in the flow of
cases necessary to ensure a steady stream of new cases into the clinic. A formal
arrangement with a local defender or prosecutor's office will afford the same regu-
larity that facilitates intra-term scheduling or assignments. An important example
of the institutionalized relationship between the clinical law program and a public
agency for securing a steady flow of appellate cases is the program at Franklin
Pierce that serves as the appellate defender for the New Hampshire state public
defender system.
42 See Mattias v. State, 683 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), rev'd 731 S.W.2d
936 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831; King v. State 733 S.W.2d 704
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987);Juan A. v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 726 S.W.2d 241
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987). Reliance on clinic-tried cases from the law school's trial clin-
ics should enhance the appellate experience because supervision at the trial court
level should afford a better protected record for appeal than is often the case. This
conclusion presupposes that the trial-level supervisors and student counsel are do-
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to indigent litigants who had previously been represented by pri-
vate counsel. Though the second two sources of cases were sta-
tistically less significant than the felony appointments, they
afforded exposure to the broader substantive law issues involved
in civil litigation and provided a basis for comparison between
the ways in which the civil and criminal rules of procedure em-
phasize the development of testimony and role of counsel.
Moreover, the availability of civil appeals for student practice
facilitated discussion of the significance of preservation of consti-
tutional claims in the appellate process when comparing criminal
and civil litigation.4 3 Early on, students involved in criminal ap-
pellate and trial work should understand the need to preserve
federal constitutional claims in the trial record4 4 and, in briefing
issues on appeal, to afford their clients the benefit of exhaustion
of state remedies in the event they ultimately intend to attempt
federal review by certiorari or writ of habeas corpus. Preserva-
tion of these claims is also significant in avoiding subsequent in-
effective-assistance claims based on failure of state trial and
appellate counsel to raise and preserve federal constitutional
claims.4 5 In contrast, civil litigation typically presents a more lo-
calized set of problems and is more often confined to thejurisdic-
tion's substantive and procedural law.
ing a thorough job in supervising and preparing the case for trial and then follow-
ing through with timely objection and preservation of error during the trial itself.
43 For example, it is important for the practitioner and student counsel to un-
derstand the role of fundamental error; that is, error which may be considered on
appeal, even if not preserved at trial, in the jurisdiction where the appeal is being
heard. Some jurisdictions have broad doctrines of fundamental error, others have
virtually none. The student practicing in New Mexico should learn that certain
prosecutorial comments on the accused's silence are subject to reversal on appeal
even in the absence of trial objection. See State v. Martin, 680 P.2d 937, 941-42
(N.M. 1984); State v. Ramirez, 648 P.2d 307 (N.M. 1982). Likewise, a student prac-
ticing in Texas must be exposed to the rule of Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (defining the parameters of fundamental error, particularly
jury instructions), in the context of criminal prosecutions. This type of error may
also be characterized as "jurisdictional" or "plain" error. See FED. R. EvID. 103(d)
(plain error doctrine in matters of admission or exclusion of evidence).
44 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2568 (1991) (holding failure
to litigate federal constitutional claims in compliance with state procedures may
properly result in bar to federal habeas review once state courts apply state proce-
dural default rules to federal claims).
45 In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), the Court held that unless the
state court defendant could show that his counsel was ineffective under the prevail-
ing standard, counsel's failure to properly preserve and litigate claims in the state
court arena would not serve as cause for excusing the failure to exhaust state reme-
dies when the accused sought federal habeas review of the same claims. Id. at 488
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
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The appropriate mix of work experience can be achieved, to
some extent, through assignment of rehearing motions and peti-
tions for review to students who have handled an initial appeal
from the record. Such assignment will assure both breadth of
experience and a manageable caseload. Otherwise, acceptance
of enough cases to provide students with a direct appeal on the
record in more than one case is likely to result in an entirely un-
manageable caseload. Once decisions begin to be filed, students
must draft post-decision motions and petitions for review, in ad-
dition to maintaining work on direct appeals.
Reliance on a heavy concentration of criminal appeals is to
some extent necessary where the focus of appellate litigation
must be on trials rather than agency determinations. The liberal
appellate rules and indigence rules increase the volume of crimi-
nal appeals in most jurisdictions.4 6 The availability of a clinical
law program to assume limited overflow of this caseload makes
this a potentially ready, and steady, source of cases.47 Apart from
the more difficult burdens that may be imposed in the review of
criminal litigation and the inherent hostility of many appellate
judges for many "technical" complaints concerning trial con-
duct,4 8 criminal appeals generally present both the same range of
problems and same type of briefing experience as civil appeals.
46 See, e.g., Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (recognizing rights of indigent
appellate litigants to appeal without payment of fees); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 18 (1956) (access to the appellate record without payment of costs); Entsminger
v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967) (effective assistance of counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387 (1985) (same). These cases demonstrate the long-term potential sources
of criminal actions and appointments for appellate clinical programs.
47 In fact, a survey of published opinions identifying law school clinical pro-
grams as counsel of record indicates special relationships between these programs
and public defender offices. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 325 S.E.2d 309, 310 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985) (identifying counsel as "Appellate Defender Adam Stein by James R.
Glover, Chapel Hill, from the Appellate Defender Clinic, of the University of North
Carolina School of Law, for defendant"); People v. Asteri, 554 N.E.2d 1059, 1060
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (identifying counsel as "Office of the State Appellate Defender,
Northwestern University Legal Clinic, Chicago (Michael J. Pelletier, Martin Carl-
son, Leslie Ann Jones, of counsel), for defendant-appellant Isaac Asteri"); State v.
Seward, 509 So. 2d 413 (La. 1987) (identifying counsel as "Dwight M. Doskey, Or-
leans Indigent Defender Program, Elizabeth Cole, New Orleans, Tulane Law
School Clinic, Renee Newman, for defendant-appellant").
48 Consider the heated discussion among the Justices in the recent decision in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 321 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("The plurality wrongly
resuscitates Justice Harlan's early view, indicating that the only procedural errors
deserving correction on collateral review are those that undermine 'an accurate de-
termination of innocence or guilt ... ' "), reh 'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989). The
Court's embracement of the harmless error doctrine in Chapman v. California, 368
U.S. 18 (1967), has permitted the Supreme Court and state appellate courts to af-
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The criminal appeal, like the civil appeal, is focused on issues
raised in the record, whereas the criminal trial may often entail
significantly different discovery procedures and obligations and
result in different factors dominating trial strategy. The result is
that the steady flow of criminal appeals affords significant bene-
fits to the clinical program in terms of regulating student work-
load and experience without significantly creating the impression
that criminal appellate practice differs markedly from civil prac-
tice, at least in terms of procedure and skills involved in the pro-
duction of the appellate brief and oral argument.
THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OR SUPERVISING ATrORNEY
The quality of the clinical law experience generally is depen-
dent upon the director or supervising attorney's skills as both
teacher and litigator. Strength of teaching, as reflected in ability
to communicate, knowledge of subject matter and concern for
student comprehension, is critical for clinical education just as it
is critical for high-quality teaching in the traditional curriculum.4 9
In addition, and often more significantly, the clinic director or
supervising attorney serves as a role model litigator for students
who are often without any basis for comparison of the model
presented, or whose comparison is predicated only upon clerking
experiences that vary widely in quality.5" To the extent that fi-
nancial constraints now compel students to support themselves
firm criminal convictions despite the existence of trial error where the evidence was
otherwise overwhelmingly sufficient to convict.
49 The Appellate Skills Training Report points out, in discussing the qualifications of
individuals teaching appellate advocacy:
The fact that a person has experience at the appellate level does not
mean, of course, that the person is competent to teach appellate skills.
The person must first and foremost be able to teach. This involves being able
to impart knowledge, to guide, to encourage, to extract general prin-
ciples from individual experiences-in short, to do all of the things a
teacher must do.
Appellate Skills Training Report, supra note 16, at 21 (emphasis added).
50 The desirability of significant and successful appellate practice experience as
a credential for the director or supervising attorney cannot be underestimated in
terms of affording a role model for students in the clinical law program. Regardless
of personality differences on the part of students, an established reputation in liti-
gation can hardly be discounted by students in evaluating the merits of critique
offered by the director or supervisor. An example of the type of litigation success
that would certainly enhance the director's image is Professor Steven H. Goldblatt's
successful representation of the petitioner in Smith v. Barry, 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992),
which dealt with the proper form of notice of appeal in the federal courts. Profes-
sor Goldblatt is Director of the Appellate Litigation Clinic at Georgetown Univer-
sity School of Law.
1992] 1295
1296 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:1277
through work or other supplemental resources, the role models
who may well impact most on advanced students are not law
faculty, but employers whose professional habits are not subject
to readily discernible external evaluation. For this reason, the
clinic director or supervising attorney, who serves a role model,
is extremely valuable in providing training that meets the institu-
tion's standards. This is perhaps one of the few opportunities
most law schools will have to counter-balance the diverse images
and illusions of practice that students are exposed to during the
last two years of the law school program.
The appellate clinic director should, then, possess a number
of important qualifications to serve the institution as both teacher
and role model.5 First, the director should be an experienced
and preferably successful appellate attorney with a range of prac-
tice background to fit the caseload that the program may gener-
ate.52 Second, the director must have a sufficient understanding
of the appellate practice rules to effectively present a specialized
course in this aspect of civil and criminal procedure.5 3 Third, the
director must also have a competent understanding of basic sub-
51 See AALS/ABA Guidelines, supra note 2, at 31-32. The AALS/ABA Guidelines sug-
gest the following factors as appropriate in determining suitability of persons for
clinical teaching:
a. prior legal experience in performing the lawyering tasks
about which one will be expected to teach;
b. prior legal experience with the types of cases and problems
the client clinic handles;
c. capacity to relate to students on a one-to-one basis;
d. capacity to accept criticism from lawyers and students regard-
ing one's performance as a lawyer;
e. capacity to evaluate student performance;
f. intellectual understanding of the theoretical and empirical
knowledge related to the issues and problems to be consid-
ered in the clinical legal studies curriculum;
g. interest in doing research related to the educational issues
existing in clinical legal studies and the legal problems raised
within the clinical legal studies curriculum; and, ability to
train and supervise the teaching of other professors, clinical
professors, supervising attorneys and cooperating attorneys.
Id.
52 Alternatives to experienced litigators might include appellate court judges
and staff counsel or attorneys having prior experience as appellate court law clerks.
See Appellate Skills Training Report, supra note 16, at 21.
53 Id. As the report notes:
Instruction in the specialized skills of appellate litigation-including
deciding whether to appeal, working with a record, choosing which
issues to raise, developing an interesting but accurate statement of
facts, and phrasing precisely the issues presented, among others-re-
quires the highest degree of professional skill of a highly specialized
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stantive law concepts, local rules or approaches, and an apprecia-
tion for potentially developing areas of the law. These skills
ensure that students in the appellate clinic program will provide
professionally competent representation to their clients. Fourth,
it is highly desirable that the director have sufficient contacts with
the local bench and bar to obtain case referrals from private or
public practitioners and to facilitate the operation of the clinic
program in local courts. Typically, this may mean that the super-
vising attorney should be experienced not only in appellate prac-
tice, but also in the appellate courts of the jurisdiction(s) in which
the program is located or will be practicing.
In addition, the integration of clinical and traditional educa-
tors in a unified faculty requires that the director or supervising
attorney be offered either traditional or clinical tenure-track sta-
tus. The institution must make a commitment to the program
and to the individual charged with supervision.54 This should in-
clude integration by offering clinical faculty members an oppor-
tunity to teach traditional courses, research support and other
benefits and obligations associated with faculty status.55
Stable funding for the program and director's position are
nature. It demands, consequently, an instructor who has the knowl-
edge and specialized skills of all aspects of appellate litigation.
Id.
54 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, § 405(e) (1986) (purports
to encourage law schools to develop tenure track or comparable positions for
clinical faculty).
55 An example of the qualifications and program expectations of a supervising
attorney in an appellate clinical law program is found in the job description in-
cluded in Tulane's announcement appearing in the AALS Placement Bulletin, Feb-
ruary 14, 1992, at 3:
TULANE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW has a clinical teaching
position available beginningJuly 1, 1992. Applications are invited for
the position of Assistant or Associate Professor of Clinical Law to
teach courses and assist in direction of the Appellate Advocacy Pro-
gram. The program handles constitutional and civil rights cases in
the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, and
periodically, in the Supreme Court. Students work as law clerks with
faculty, who prepare the briefs and argue the appeals in those courts.
Applicants must have three years of legal experience, preferably in
federal appellate practice. Applicants with experience in supervision
of law clerks, student-attorneys, and lawyers in brief writing are pre-
ferred. Applicants must be immediately eligible for admission to the
bars of the above-listed federal courts and the Louisiana bar. A suc-
cessful applicant must be prepared to take the Louisiana bar no later
than July of 1992. The appointment will be in the non-tenured
clinical faculty track, under an inital three-year contract with eligibility
for conversion to a tenure-track position. We specifically encourage
applications from women and minorities.
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essential because the cases processed by an appellate clinic, as
opposed to a trial clinic, tend to be on-going in nature. Conse-
quently, the acceptance of new cases for a given semester carries
with it the obligation to continue representation for months or
even years following the end of the semester to ensure that avail-
able avenues of litigation on direct appeal have been ex-
hausted.56 Thus, in contemplating the development of an
appellate clinical law program experimentally, the institution
must address the issue of how the representation can be contin-
ued in clinic cases in the event lack of funds for continuation of
the program or faculty dissatisfaction with the program's conduct
require its dissolution. Referral of pending cases back to public
agencies initially referring the appeals to the program is one way
of dealing with this contingency. Alternatively, the institution
may simply contract with the supervising attorney or director to
personally litigate these cases to conclusion in the event the pro-
gram is discontinued.
THE ROLE OF NON-CLINIC FACULTY
In contrast to the lack of immediacy that much clinical edu-
cation brings to the intellectual interests of non-clinical faculty,
an appellate clinic can readily involve traditional teachers in the
problems that arise in appellate litigation. Not infrequently, stu-
dents are confronted with fairly novel substantive5 7 or proce-
56 The issue of counsel's continuing duty to provide representation through the
various steps of the appellate process to indigent litigants is often a difficult one.
The Supreme Court, however, in Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), has
held that an indigent criminal defendant has no right to assistance of appointed
counsel in any proceeding following the completion of the direct appeal. The issue
has resurfaced concerning representation of death row inmates in Murray v. Giar-
ratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989), with the majority holding that the Constitution does not
include a right to representation in post-conviction criminal matters even for in-
mates facing execution of state court-imposed death sentences.
Clearly, a law school clinical program should contemplate completion of all
avenues available on direct appeal or review from the decision on direct appeal
simply to avoid a subsequent claim of abandonment or ineffective assistance. See,
e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (deprivation of assistance of counsel on
direct appeal violates fundamental constitutional guarantees).
57 For example, SMU Civil Cases Clinic students lost an appeal challenging an
interest rate as usurious when the court of appeals held that a usurious practice
could be excused if it resulted from accident or error. Page v. Cent. Bank & Trust
Co., 548 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). Another Civil Cases Clinic appeal,
Sayre v. Mu/ins, 681 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. 1984), resulted in recognition of a discharged
hospital worker's right to assistance of counsel in a grievance proceeding initiated
as a result of her termination.
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dural5 8 issues that can be developed more efficiently and
creatively with input from specialists in the particular area of the
law involved. Interaction of students and non-clinical faculty
with respect to the approaches to be taken in issue development
and argument has three positive results.
First, students benefit from the faculty's expertise in areas
relevant to a particular issue generated by the appeal. Not only
may the faculty member offer a range of theories that might not
be assessed by the student or supervising attorney, but the
faculty member often has a national perspective on the issue that
may direct the student to developments in other jurisdictions
that should be explored in arguing the merits of the client's posi-
tion.59 While the supervising attorney is primarily qualified by
breadth of experience, exposure to local practice and substantive
holdings, the non-clinical faculty member typically brings a more
specialized, national approach to the particular issues of interest
in the teacher's field. Thus, the student may effectively draw
upon a wider range of intellectual resources than may otherwise
be available if supervision of the appeal is simply limited to the
director or supervising attorney.
Second, the level of representation is improved by having
clinical matters discussed by non-clinic faculty. Inevitably, the re-
sult of such interaction should either be reasoned critique of the
approaches taken by the clinician and clinical students, or simply
a greater appreciation for the intellectual content of the clinical
law program. To the extent that an appellate clinic focuses on
the development of law through the case approach, it provides a
practical complement to the traditional case approach of class-
room teaching. The interaction of clinical and non-clinical
faculty in this respect should significantly enhance both the qual-
58 A number of SMU clinic appeals, for instance, have focused on procedural
rights applicable in parental rights termination and juvenile matters. Director, Dal-
las County Child Welfare Unit v. Thompson, 667 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984)
(notarization of affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights not fatal to instrument
where notary employed by party having adverse interest in litigation); C.L.B. v.
State, 567 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. 1978) (construing State's limited right of appeal in
juvenile matters); State v. LJB, 561 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) (holding sum-
mary judgment procedure not available to juvenile challenging sufficiency of delin-
quency or supervision petition); Hutson v. Haggard, 475 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1971) (holding voluntary abandonment of child established by evidence).
59 As an example, Professor Charles J. Morris of the SMU faculty, a nationally
recognized scholar and author in the field of labor law, represented a clinic client in
the Texas Supreme Court. Professor Morris briefed and argued the case in the
Texas Supreme Court, although he is not included as counsel of record on appeal
in the published opinion in the Southwestern Reporter. Sayre, 681 S.W.2d at 25.
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ity of experience for clinical students and the relationship of
clinical education to more traditional approaches. Moreover, to
the extent that the overlap focuses on procedural matters or
questions of strategy and tactics, the clinical student may draw
upon other non-traditional teaching methods also present in the
law school curriculum, such as programs in trial advocacy or oral
advocacy, for development of skills immediately relevant to the
clinic caseload.
Third, not only do clinic students and practitioners benefit
from faculty interaction in the evaluation or development of spe-
cific issues, but the institution should benefit as well. Interaction
of the clinical and non-clinical faculty should theoretically pro-
mote the value of clinical education within the total program and
reduce clinicians' tendency to be treated as second-class faculty
members. It should also afford a practical basis for evaluating the
desirability of continuing the clinical program in its current form.
Rather than decisions on the direction of clinical education being
predicated solely on cost or traditional antipathy toward new ed-
ucational approaches, these decisions can be based on more di-
rect knowledge of the clinic's operation and its course content by
involved non-clinicians.
Non-clinical faculty involvement in cases handled by the
SMU Appellate Clinic was not substantial during its existence,
but some preliminary indications of interest from certain faculty
members were evident. Presumably, with time, more issues de-
serving the input of traditional faculty would have emerged and
afforded students greater reason to inquire about specific points
of law, particularly those dealing with Texas procedural and sub-
stantive law issues which were likely to interest faculty members
with some local orientation. As with any faculty, however, lack of
accessibility of certain teachers would have undoubtedly limited
the potential for integration of non-clinical faculty into the
clinical program. Accessible faculty would have continued to be
available for student questions, just as they are in the absence of
clinic-based reasons for the inquiries, but the overall institutional
contribution to clinic representation is a particularly valuable fea-
ture of faculty input in appellate representation.
THE CLASSROOM COMPONENT OF THE COURSE
Effective teaching of oral advocacy should involve a class-
room, non-case component. This component may be necessary
to persuade faculty to authorize a particular number of credit
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hours for an appellate clinic experience, but beyond the political
value of the classroom study lies an important role for the stu-
dent's education. The non-case component should emphasize at
least three distinct features to ensure that students are taught to
handle competently appellate matters upon graduation.
First, the classroom component should ideally devote atten-
tion to appellate decision-making matters, an aspect of legal de-
velopment often unaddressed or marginally addressed in the
traditional subjects taught by the reading of appellate deci-
sions.6 ° Rules of appellate decision-making 6 and preservation of
error6 2 are uniquely significant in understanding not the rule
generated by a case, but the way in which the court made a deci-
sion to generate the ruling. When the SMU Appellate Clinic op-
erated, no satisfactory text was available to explore appellate
decision-making, as opposed to appellate decisions. About the same
time the clinic wound down its operations, Martineau's casebook
on appellate practice and process appeared,63 offering the type of
text necessary for an intellectually cohesive approach to the class-
room component of the appellate clinic course. This edition may
well be challenged by the appearance of other volumes in the
coming years, 64 but it represents an important breakthrough in
recognizing that the decision-making process of the appellate
courts themselves deserves scrutiny in the law school curricu-
lum. 6 5 Availability of this type of material will facilitate the devel-
60 See Martineau, supra note 15.
61 See Robert W. Calvert, "No evidence" and "Insufficient evidence" Points of Error, 38
TEX. L. REV. 361 (1960). This article, one of the most influential articles in Texas
jurisprudence, is critical in understanding Texas appellate and supreme court juris-
diction to review evidentiary sufficiency challenges in civil appeals. This insight
into appellate decision-making, as opposed to understanding the rules of appellate
procedure, requires study beyond the rules and cases interpreting the appellate
rules. The problems discussed in this article, perhaps the most cited in Texas deci-
sions, are typically not the type of problems that would be accommodated in an
introductory procedure course. They might, however, be discussed in an advanced
course in Texas Trial and Appellate Procedure, and easily could be developed thor-
oughly in a seminar devoted to preservation and presentation of error in Texas
practice.
62 See Martineau, supra note 15, at 82 (noting the "key requirement of preserving
issues for appeal").
63 See ROBERTJ. MARTINEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON APPELLATE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE (1987).
64 See, e.g., BENTELE & CARY, APPELLATE ADVOCACY (1990). Professor Bentele is
director of the appellate clinical law program at Brooklyn Law School.
65 The Appellate Skills Training Report noted the lack of standard law school class-
room materials dealing with appellate process in its 1985 report: "The lack of any
casebook designed for use in a course on appellate courts and the law of the appel-
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opment of traditionally taught courses on the subject and
provide a text for use in teaching a classroom component of an
appellate clinic program.
Second, the classroom component should focus on statutes
and court rules governing appellate practice in the jurisdiction
where the clinic operates. 66 These rules are less likely to be sub-
ject to intense instruction during any other course in procedure,
if only because they tend to be highly technical and localized in
nature.67 In addition, to the extent that even two-semester
courses in basic civil procedure are often insufficient to cover all
material deemed necessary to provide an overview of the litiga-
tion process, the rules governing appellate matters are simply
unaddressed in many cases because of time constraints. 68 Never-
theless, an understanding of the interplay of procedural rules,
statutes governing appellate rights and practice, and the court
rules generated by individual appellate courts is critical for a
practitioner's understanding of the correct way in which to repre-
late process may be one reason why relatively few courses devoted to these topics
have been developed. "Appellate Skills Training Report, supra note 16, at 23 n.24.
66 See Martineau, supra note 15, at 82 ("Without a thorough knowledge of the
statutes, rules and judicial doctrines that constitute the law of appellate process,
lawyers who take or defend an appeal are simply operating outside their area of
competence." The interplay of rules and statutes may be seen in the Arkansas
Rules of Appellate Procedure, which generally govern the procedure by which a
case is appealed; the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals of the State
of Arkansas, which set forth specific requirements for designation and preparation
of the record on appeal and preparation and filing of appellate briefs; and ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (d), (e) (Michie 1988) by which the General Assembly has
circumscribed appellate review by the state supreme court in death penalty cases.
For an example of appellate doctrine critical to the understanding of appellate pro-
cess within a particular jurisdiction, see Calvert, supra note 59.
67 For example, an important consideration for practitioners often ignored or
barely touched upon in the typica: law school course involves the setting and collec-
tion of fees. The classroom component of a clinical law course permits exploration
of the economic and ethical considerations involved in fee setting and collection.
In the context of the classroom component in an appellate clinical program, the
focus might be on the problem posed when retained trial counsel seeks to withdraw
from representation on appeal and asks the court to appoint counsel for the client
who has exhausted his resource in payment of the trial fee. This scenario raises
interesting issues of professional responsibility and public policy and is not a prob-
lem simply noted in the abstract. See United States v. Lopez-Flores, 701 F. Supp.
597 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
68 In one well-known civil procedure casebook, for example, the materials de-
voted to "Appeals" begin on page 1213 of a 1253-page casebook. The cases in-
cluded focus on finality of trial court decisions for purposes of appellate review. See
RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th
ed. 1984).
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sent a client on appeal in the particular jurisdiction.69 Therefore,
to the extent that clinical education seeks to prepare students for
practice, this would appear a necessary component of the
course's classroom portion.
Third, the classroom component should ideally provide
some simulation to ensure a uniform experience conceivably un-
available through random case distribution. This simulated ex-
perience can focus on drafting a sample point of error, but this
exercise is preparatory because any exposure to appellate prac-
tice will afford the student an introduction to the process of iden-
tifying the issue, finding factual support in the record, stating the
point of error on appeal, and arguing the issue on the merits by
applying relevant legal principles gleaned from research of appli-
cable statutory and case law. The exercise is designed to assess
the student's skill in a mock situation prior to assigning the stu-
dent responsibility for issue development in an actual case.
Simulated oral argument more likely serves the goal of pro-
viding a uniform experience for clinic students. Even in jurisdic-
tions-such as Texas-where oral argument is still retained as a
matter of right (at least on direct appeal)70 no student is guaran-
69 Familiarity with the appellate rules of different jurisdictions will give rise to
interesting comparisons in the local particularities to approaching appellate proce-
dure. For example, the only document that need be filed in Texas to give notice of
appeal in the typical civil case is the appeal bond or affidavit of inability to pay
costs. See TEX. R. App. PROC. 40(a). In criminal cases, the appellant need only give
a general notice of appeal in writing following imposition of sentence. See TEx. R.
App. PROC. 40(b). In contrast, the notice of appeal invoking the jurisdiction of the
Colorado appellate court must also include substantial information involving the
nature of the case, ruling below and issues that will be raised on appeal. See CoLo.
R. App. PROC. 3. The simple notice of appeal, which triggers the appellate process
in New Mexico, N.M.S. CT. R. ANN. 12-202 (1986 Recomp.), must be followed by a
timely filing of a docketing statement that details the holding below, evidence
presented at trial or on the motion, the issues to be raised on appeal and the au-
thorities supporting the appellant's points of error. N.M.S. CT. R. ANN. 12-208
(1986 Recomp.). While the docketing statement may be amended within limita-
tions, this instrument serves as the principal vehicle for assignment of cases to the
various calendars used by the New Mexico Supreme Court of Appeals, including
assignment to the summary calendar for disposition based solely upon the informa-
tion, issues and supporting authority contained in the docketing statement and any
memorandum in opposition filed by the party opposing the disposition announced
in the court's calendaring notice.
70 For example, Rule 75(1) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:
Right to Argument. When a case is properly prepared for submission,
any party who has filed briefs in accordance with the rules prescribed
therefore and who has made a timely request for oral argument under
(f) hereof may, upon the call of the case for submission, submit an
oral argument to the court.
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teed an argument in the case they may have briefed because of
the delay in processing an appeal, which typically exceeds the sin-
gle semester dedicated by the course. Students may be afforded
the opportunity to argue cases briefed by prior clinic classes,
which will provide the chance to appear in court, but this also
exposes the student to the very real anxiety of having to argue a
position that has been developed by another lawyer, and often
not as fully as the lawyer arguing the case might have desired. Of
course, this anxiety is often no less significant than that suffered
by the attorney required to draft an appellate brief when trial
counsel did a poor job of protecting the record. There is some
educational value to be gained from exposing future appellate
and trial lawyers to this problem.
ENSURING COMPETENT REPRESENTATION
The most critical aspect of the clinic program lies not in the
quality of the educational experience, but in the quality of repre-
sentation afforded by clinic students. Presumably, a program will
be evaluated, from the faculty standpoint, by its contribution to
the overall institutional program and its goals. If the program is
found wanting, it will either be improved or abandoned. During
the intervening period between inception and review, however,
and thereafter, it is the responsibility of the clinic director or su-
pervising attorney to ensure that the clinic affords its clients qual-
ity representation in the appellate courts. Based on the
experience at SMU, the director must actively engage in the ap-
pellate process in at least four important respects:
1. The director or supervising attorney must review each
record on appeal independently of student review to make cer-
tain that all colorable issues are identified and that issues
which should be raised on appeal in the discretion of the di-
rector are properly briefed. 7
2. The director or supervising attorney must review each
point of error specifically and each brief, generally, to be satis-
TEX. R. App. PROC. 75 (1).
In contrast, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a) permits a circuit court
panel to dispense oral argument if the panel determines that oral argument would
not aid the court in reaching a decision on the merits of the case, that the appeal is
frivolous or that the dispositive issued presented by the appeal is controlled by
recent authority.
71 InJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983), a majority of the Court held
that the decision as to which issues should be raised and argued on appeal, even in
the case of court-appointed appellate counsel in criminal appeals, lies in the attor-
ney's sound discretion. Id.
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fled that the presentation is theoretically sound and profes-
sionally argued."2 Close contact with the student during the
period of research, including discussion of relevant authorities
relied upon or distinguished, is essential in protecting against
improper reliance on authority or misapprehension of gov-
erning principles of law.
3. The director should be present and available at oral
argument in the event the student falters or requires assist-
ance in addressing questions. Athough failure to respond at
oral argument is a threat each appellate lawyer faces, the di-
rector's role is not so much to shield the student from the ex-
perience, but to protect the client's interests from an error or
lapse in responding to the court's inquiry or a point by oppos-
ing counsel. In arguing on an appellant's behalf, the director
may simply elect to present the rebuttal in any jurisdiction that
will permit division of the oral argument between co-counsel
to reserve an opportunity to address unresolved points or clar-
ify positions or responses to inquiries by the court.
4. The director must review the appellate decision to as-
sess the client's options following disposition of the appeal,
motion for rehearing or petition for review. While the student
should be involved in this evaluation, it may prove unnecessa-
rily difficult to assign a student who is unfamiliar with the case
the burden of assessing the court's opinion regarding the ar-
guments previously raised. Evaluation of the opinion in light
of the authorities relied upon and based on facts related in the
opinion itself should not prove unduly burdensome, however,
because this is typically what happens in any other law school
exercise. Following the decision on how to proceed and after
counseling the client, the director may then appropriately as-
sign the next step in the process to another student.
Surprisingly, the same supervisory function over the briefing
and argument of appeals is often not provided by private practition-
ers, who may assign appellate work to inexperienced attorneys or
simply hire law students to produce their appellate briefs. While
these practices may go undetected, they certainly exist and may well
explain in part why the quality of appellate practice is often erratic
in many appellate courts. Poor quality does not always result, of
course. The actual performance of the attorney who is so disinter-
ested in the prosecution of the appeal might be far more erratic than
72 One important concern for the supervising attorney is to make certain that
student counsel cite adverse authority that might not otherwise be made known to
the appellate court, in the brief or oral argument when the authority is from the
controlling jurisdiction. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1983).
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the "stabilizing" influence of a young associate or law student who
is still fresh from the educational process and eager to enter the
fray.
The range of duties required of the clinic director necessarily
limits the number of students who can be adequately supervised
during the term without additional supervisory personnel. Probably
no more than eight students can be adequately supervised during
any given semester, assuming the program seeks to have each stu-
dent involved in work on three cases or three distinct projects. Op-
timally, with eight students, supervision might be more practical by
assigning students to work in pairs and dividing the work within
each case or assignment. This approach may appear artificial to stu-
dents, however, because each case does not typically offer an obvi-
ous division of labor-a factor much more likely to be found in the
typical-moot court problem. More intensive supervision can be pro-
vided if enrollment is limited to six students per supervising attor-
ney without restricting the caseload. Such limited enrollment will
ensure that students are exposed to the full range of activity in-
volved in litigating appeals generally.
In contrast to the situation presented by private representation
in many cases, the representation afforded by clinical law students
under competent supervision is probably more likely to have a uni-
form measure of high quality, to exhibit the product of higher ex-
penditure of energy-particularly in terms of research-and to offer
a more creative approach to trial error. To the extent that the brief
prepared and argued by clinical students reflects the commitment to
quality espoused by the institution, that should surely be the case.
CONCLUSION
The SMU Appellate Clinic did not represent a novel ap-
proach to clinical education, even though it was apparently the
first such formal foray in student practice in Texas appellate
courts. The program offered an opportunity for students to gain
practical insight into the heart of legal education-the develop-
ment of law through appellate decisionmaking. With stable fund-
ing, increased faculty support and an additional supervising
attorney, the program could have made a more significant impact
within the law school curriculum, particularly if it had been
taught in conjunction with a traditional course in appellate pro-
cess and practice.
What seems clear is that the appellate clinic experience is a
most satisfactory and professional way in which to approach the
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problem of teaching appellate advocacy. 73 To the extent that law
schools should be concerned with the development of competent
litigators, this type of program can be an attractive alternative or
a supplement to both the traditional programs in moot court and
mock advocacy and the core curriculum. Moreover, with time
and experience in the appellate courts, the clinical program may
prove a valuable force in the development of the substantive law
and procedure of the jurisdiction.
73 Given fiscal constraints, however, the curriculum advocated by Professor Mar-
tineau would appear to provide the most cost-effective approach to educating stu-
dents in appellate process and practice. See Martineau, supra note 15, at 83-85.
